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HOW SHOULD INHERITANCE LAW
REMEDIATE INEQUALITY?
Felix B. Chang*
Abstract: This Article argues that trusts and estates (“T&E”) should prioritize
intergenerational economic mobility—the ability of children to move beyond the economic
stations of their parents—above all other goals. The field’s traditional emphasis on
testamentary freedom, or the freedom to distribute property in a will as one sees fit, fosters the
stickiness of inequality. For wealthy settlors, dynasty trusts sequester assets from the nation’s
system of taxation and stream of commerce. For low-income decedents, intestacy (i.e., the
system of property distribution for a person who dies without a will) splinters property rights
and inhibits their transfer, especially to nontraditional heirs.
Holistically, this Article argues that T&E should promote mean regression of the wealth
distribution curve over time. This can be accomplished by loosening spending in ultrawealthy
households and spurring savings and investment in low-income households.
T&E scholars are tackling inequality with greater urgency than ever before, yet basic
questions remain. For instance, what do we mean by “inequality”? How can we remediate
inequality? And what goals should we advance in redressing inequality? This Article
contributes to these conversations by articulating a comprehensive framework for progressive
inheritance law that redresses long-term inequality.
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INTRODUCTION
Every generation gets the trusts and estates (“T&E”) scholarship it
deserves.1 In our era of rampant inequality, the traditional conception of
T&E, as a field animated by testamentary freedom,2 now seems outdated.
Freedom of testation entrenches the privileges and wealth distributions of
the status quo.3 At its most extreme, the cold, dead hand of a decedent can
steer the disposition of their assets in perpetuity, outside the reach of all
creditors.4
Today, T&E scholars are confronting the doctrines and default rules
most responsible for accelerating inequality.5 But fundamental questions
remain. What do scholars mean by “inequality,” and how can inheritance
law advance holistic solutions that distribute wealth more evenly across
society?
Existing proposals have overlooked how T&E’s components fit
together—as well as how they complement, or work against, the broader
legal and economic system. For instance, business laws determine how
wealth is generated in the first instance. If the ground rules for inheritance
1. See Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearing Before the S. Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 88th Cong. 8 (1963) (statement of
Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States) https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/09-25-1963.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC6E-HT3F] (“[E]very society
gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true is that every community gets the kind of
law enforcement it insists on.”); NINA AUERBACH, OUR VAMPIRES, OURSELVES 145 (1995) (“[E]very
age embraces the vampire it needs.”).
2. Testamentary freedom is the freedom of a testator to dispose of their estate as they please. See
John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 & n.9
(1975). More colorfully, testamentary freedom is often called “dead hand control.” See RAY D.
MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 76 (2010).
3. Naomi Cahn, Dismantling the Trusts and Estates Canon, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 165, 167–68.
4. See Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149,
1158–60 (2011) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW (2009)).
5. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for Wills,
Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 340–43 (2014) (advancing a critical view of
T&E that reveals structural barriers to socioeconomic equality); Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting
Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 464–68 (2010) (evaluating
how facially neutral inheritance laws perpetuate wealth inequality); Carla Spivack, Broken Links: A
Critique of Formal Equality in Inheritance Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 191, 192 (extending the discourse
on formal equality to inheritance law).
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and succession are inattentive to the disparities spurred by corporate law,
financial regulation, and competition policy, then those disparities can be
locked in across generations.6 Similarly, boom and bust cycles produce
winners and losers. Dead hand control of wealth can augment the ensuing
disparities by keeping large pools of assets out of the stream of commerce
and countering government measures to loosen spending.7
A bimodal distribution now defines the instruments of T&E. On one
hand, trusts and nonprobate instruments cater to the privacy desires and
dynastic aspirations of the hyperwealthy.8 On the other hand, intestacy
and the probate system serve low-income households terribly, throwing
intrafamilial conflicts into public view.9 This schism, between probate and
nonprobate, reinforces the unequal distribution of incomes and family
compositions across society.10
This Article shows how T&E can remediate wealth inequality at a
macroeconomic scale.11 Many of its rules are inputs into the tax system, a
comprehensive redress for inequality. For example, fortifying the rule
against perpetuities (“RAP”) frees up large estates for taxation and, more
importantly, incentivizes settlors 12 to divert assets to spending.13 At the
other end of the wealth spectrum, where most decedents pass without
having written wills,14 intestacy reform could preserve assets for

6. See Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries in the Generation and Transmission of Wealth, 79 OHIO ST.
L.J. 73, 75–76 (2018); Allison Anna Tait, The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 ALA. L. REV.
981, 984–85 (2020). See generally Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality:
The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017).
7. See Eric Kades, Of Piketty and Perpetuities: Dynastic Wealth in the Twenty-First Century (and
Beyond), 60 B.C. L. REV. 145, 177–78 (2019).
8. See infra section III.A.
9. See infra section III.B.
10. See infra section II.C.
11. For a definition of macroeconomics and its intersections with law, see Yair Listokin, Law and
Macro: What Took So Long?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 144 (2020), noting
“[m]acroeconomics is the study of how the aggregate economy behaves, examining phenomena like
inflation, growth, unemployment, money, and interest rates.”
12. A settlor is the person who creates a trust. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 (AM. L. INST.
2003).
13. The most well-known formulation of the RAP is that “[n]o interest is good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” JOHN
CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 174 (3d ed. 1915). The rule determines when
estate taxes accrue to a trust; if a state has abolished the RAP or set the vesting period at 1,000 years,
grantors can settle trusts under those rules to escape estate taxes altogether. See Jesse Dukeminier &
James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1313–15 (2003); see also
26 U.S.C. § 2631 (enacting the GST exemption amount).
14. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53
B.C. L. REV. 877, 878 (2012). The rate of intestacy is difficult to quantify, but most studies suggest
that the rate is well over 60%. See id. at 887–89 and accompanying sources.
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productive use by heirs, thereby supplementing government programs, tax
refunds, and intermittent stimuli. 15
Yet reforming T&E’s rules and doctrines can produce distortions that
complicate any remediation of inequality. Tightening the tax loopholes
around dynasty trusts16 might prove counterproductive if, for instance,
settlors choose to invest rather than spend down money that would
otherwise fund trusts.17 When elites seek investment opportunities in a
stagnant economy, like the one we find ourselves in today, their wealth
compounds much more quickly than the incomes of average wageworkers.18 Inequality accelerates in the short term.19
We must therefore be mindful of how inheritance laws and the
macroeconomy fit together. Where there is incongruence (e.g., between
reducing inequality and cushioning recessions) or indeterminacy (e.g.,
when we trade one type of inequality for another), this Article argues that
T&E should prioritize the long-term goal of fostering intergenerational
economic mobility (“IEM”)—the ability of children to move beyond the
economic stations of their parents.20
By reorienting inheritance law around IEM, this Article provides a
theoretical framework for addressing inequality. Its singular contribution

15. On the tortuous path of debates over pandemic stimulus checks in early 2021, see Luke
Broadwater & Jim Tankersley, Biden’s Economic Plan Is Set to Clear a Senate Hurdle, SEATTLE
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2021, 9:02 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/bidens-economic-planis-set-to-clear-a-senate-hurdle/ [https://perma.cc/7CN6-5WLT] and Luke Broadwater & Jim
Tankersley, Republicans Pitch Biden on Smaller Aid Plan as Democrats Prepare to Act Alone, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/us/politics/republicans-bidencoronavirus-stimulus.html [https://perma.cc/GVL8-ZDS6].
16. Dynasty trusts, or perpetual trusts, are trusts created under the laws of a state that has repealed
the RAP, avoiding estate and wealth transfer taxes altogether. Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here
to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts 1–8 (Univ. Mich. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch.
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 259, 2016), https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=
09610100502912302908610609603000507201403200900906702112502807912502600511802110
20810561060370480080240030980840810921080930291030810130340350050030831071150031
20065034004029073072078011113101024125009114019078070068101065124091123094006116
108069064&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE\ [https://perma.cc/LW3V-GRE9]. For a response, see
generally Bridget J. Crawford, Who Is Afraid of Perpetual Trusts?, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 79 (2012), addressing an early draft of Professor Waggoner’s criticisms of perpetual
trusts).
17. See infra section III.A.
18. See Robert Armstrong, Opinion, Rising Markets and Inequality Grow from the Same Root, FIN.
TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/a25bf8b6-a962-11ea-a766-7c300513fe47 (last
visited Jan. 14, 2022).
19. Id.
20. In economics, IEM can be defined and measured in different ways. One option is to gauge the
elasticity of incomes between fathers and sons, so as to avoid the variability of women’s income in
the labor force due to the gendered wage gap. See Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality of
Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 79, 81 (2013).
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is to unify the disparate calls for reform within T&E. Concerned about
runaway inequality, scholars prescribe a variety of changes to T&E’s rules
and standards, riddling its defaults with exceptions.21 Left unabated, this
trend will leave the regime “more holes than cheese.” An overhaul of T&E
is therefore needed to redress inequality—and it should start with the
field’s foundational principles.22
The attention to IEM allows this Article to take a macroeconomic
perspective that brings T&E into sharper relief, highlighting the field’s
capacity to accomplish two goals—loosening spending in ultrawealthy
households and spurring savings and investment in low-income
households.23 The first goal breaks up accumulated wealth among the
ultrarich, while the second goal eases the transmission of wealth in lowincome households. If realized, these aspirations will induce the extreme
ends of the wealth distribution bell curve to converge toward the middle.
More broadly, estate planning funnels resources both into and out of
the macroeconomy. The demarcations separating tax law (which
effectuates redistribution), business law (which governs the generation of
wealth), and T&E (which governs the intergenerational transmission of
wealth) can be blurry.24 Yet inheritance law can also be a critical interface
to claw back the ill-gotten gains incentivized by lax business laws.
Inheritance law can then redirect those gains into the tax system in a
progressive manner, targeting large estates for taxation while leaving
small estates intact.25 Assembling these threads into a comprehensive
framework, this Article provides a blueprint for what progressive
inheritance law might look like.
Secondarily, this Article enriches the law and macroeconomics
literature by illustrating how T&E can check inequality. “Law and macro”
is quickly emerging as an alternative to the efficiency-obsessed,
microeconomics-focused bent of law and economics.26 Yet inequality
21. See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, What Happened to Grandma’s House: The Real Property
Implications of Dying Intestate, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2603, 2637 (2020) (proposing a prohibition
on tax sales and foreclosures of decedent property in order to prevent loss of wealth); Heather K.
Way, Informal Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113,
120–22 (2009) (analyzing provision of clear title to properties inherited by low-income households).
22. E.g., testamentary freedom; see infra section I.A.
23. See infra section II.C.
24. See Chang, supra note 6, at 84–86 (conceptualizing wealth—and its regulation—as a system).
25. Id. at 85–86.
26. See generally Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions,
34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 791 (2017) (advancing a macroeconomic perspective on law); Listokin, supra
note 11 (exploring why the development of law and macroeconomics lagged so far behind that of law
and microeconomics). Professor Listokin now organizes an annual Law and Macro conference. For
the latest program, see 4TH CONFERENCE ON LAW AND MACROECONOMICS,
https://lawandmacroeconomics.com/ [https://perma.cc/V2KU-FPE3].
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presents unique challenges. The compounding of wealth inequality does
not swing like, or follow the pace of, economic cycles—it is a slower burn,
though intensifying in recent years.27 Since 1986, when updates to the
Generation Skipping Transfer tax spurred the creation of dynasty trusts,28
the U.S. has undergone at least four cycles of recession and recovery,
including the 2008 financial crisis.29 During this time, inequality has not
wavered.30 Some of the antidotes to inequality emanating from T&E will
take generations to bear fruit. And as a stimulus measure, constraining
dynasty trusts might, perversely, incentivize settlors to seek out
investments, which further concentrates corporate wealth.31 We must
therefore be mindful of how laws governing the transmission of wealth
(i.e., T&E) and the economy fit together.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Part I makes the case
for IEM as T&E’s animating principle, abandoning the misplaced
deference to testamentary freedom. Part II argues that a focus on IEM can
reduce long-term inequality by pulling both ultrawealthy and low-income
households closer to the middle of the wealth distribution spectrum. With
these guideposts, Part III outlines what a progressive brand of T&E might
look like, assessing reforms to dynasty trusts and intestacy.
I.

Reorienting the Goals of Trusts and Estates

T&E was long thought to be the province of testamentary freedom, or
the notion that a testator can dispose of their assets however they please.32
Until roughly 1990, neither inequality nor redistribution played much role

27. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 2–3 (2012).
28. Robert H. Freilich, Eliminating Perpetual Trusts Is a Critical Step Towards Alleviating
America’s Devastating Income Inequality, 88 UMKC L. REV. 65, 78 (2019); Waggoner, supra note
16, at 1–2.
29. See Tom Huddleston Jr., How Many Recessions You’ve Actually Lived Through and What
Happened in Every One, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2020, 2:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/09/whathappened-in-every-us-recession-since-the-great-depression.html [https://perma.cc/N2LG-YBRN].
30. ANJALI BHATT, MELINA KOLB & OLIVER WARD, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., HOW TO
FIX INCOME INEQUALITY? (Madona Devasahayam & Steven R. Weisman eds., 2020),
https://www.piie.com/microsites/how-fix-economic-inequality#group-Intro-dc0T90OR22
[https://perma.cc/VT2N-HTDW].
31. See infra Part I.
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a
(AM. L. INST. 2003) (freedom of testation is the “organizing principle of the American law of donative
transfers”). A testator is the “person who executes a will.” SHELDON F. KURTZ, DAVID M. ENGLISH
& THOMAS P. GALLANIS, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 24 (6th ed. 2021).
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in the field.33 This is understandable. After all, T&E governs discrete
relationships among heirs and between principals and agents. It is replete
with legal rules balancing the interests among tightly drawn circles of
constituents.34 Even the handful of T&E scholars embracing economic
analysis have avoided the subject of redistribution.35
This section makes the case for reorienting T&E’s organizing principle
from testamentary freedom to intergenerational economic mobility. It
begins by tracing the evolution of T&E scholarship from testamentary
freedom to inequality. Then it examines the macroeconomic markers of
IEM.
A.

The Shift from Testamentary Freedom to Redressing Inequality

The approach of T&E scholars toward testamentary freedom has
evolved over time. In 1975, John Langbein wrote that “virtually the entire
law of wills derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose
of his property as he pleases in death as in life.”36 Professor Langbein
made this sweeping declaration to marshal outrage against the rigid
formalism of wills execution, which requires wills to be written and
signed by testators and attested by witnesses.37 As he and others saw it,
these formalities emanated from the arcane Wills Act of 1677, which

33. See Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990) (foundational
article arguing that property owned at death should be sold with proceeds paid to the government);
see also Crawford & Infanti, supra note 5, at 340 (“In view of the role that the law of wills, trusts,
and estates plays in perpetuating the concentration of wealth and reifying the privilege of a wealthy
few, one would expect that an examination of this area through the lens of socioeconomic class would
be a natural starting point for critical analysis. Surprisingly, however, there is a paucity of work
exploring the class-based aspects of the law of wills, trusts, and estates.”).
34. Heirs are generally the takers under a will, trust, or other applicable succession law. See KURTZ
ET AL., supra note 32, at 12. In T&E, agents include trustees and executors, whose principals would
be heirs and beneficiaries. The legal rules of T&E include intestacy, rules of construction, execution
formalities, and curative doctrines (all of which apportion estates among heirs) and fiduciary duties
(which apportion the balance of power between beneficiaries and fiduciaries such as executors and
trustees). For a full taxonomy, see Chang, supra note 6.
35. For examples of economic analysis of T&E sans redistribution, see Adam J. Hirsch & William
K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6–8 (1992); Daniel B. Kelly,
Trust Term Extension: An Economic Analysis, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 85, 87–88 (2015); and Lee-ford
Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579,
2589 (2011). But see Chang, supra note 6, at 92, 96–98 (identifying how law and economics scholars
in particular downplay the redistributive potential of legal rules); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 823 (2000) (“[T]he income tax system possesses
several clear advantages over legal rules as a means of redistribution.”).
36. Langbein, supra note 2, at 491. Langbein did note estate taxes as an exception, and he was
writing in the broader context of execution formalities.
37. Id. at 490.
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could be unresponsive to testamentary desires.38 These reformers
therefore pushed for probate courts to suspend execution requirements if
doing so would honor testamentary intent.39
At the time, the estate tax exemption was $60,000, and the top estate
tax rate was 77% (applying to a top bracket of $10 million and beyond).40
Advocates of estate tax repeal (hereinafter, the “Repealers”) were mostly
an unsympathetic band of superrich families who garnered the occasional
rate reduction or legislative preference.41 Professor Langbein had invoked
testamentary freedom in his fight to add a more liberal curative doctrine
into the Uniform Probate Code for nonconforming wills.42 Over time,
however, he would become indelibly associated with the contractarian
turn in T&E’s fiduciary standards, which loosened the duties binding
trustees and investment advisors.43 This turn reflected the ethos of the
time—the libertarian creep of law and economics into antitrust, contracts,
corporate law, torts, and eventually T&E.44 The enduring legacy of
Professor Langbein’s body of work, then, is the sentiment that testators
should be able to dispose of their assets as they please.
A generation later in 1990, when the estate tax exemption had grown
over tenfold to $600,000 and the top estate tax rate had dwindled to 55%
(applying to a top bracket of three million), 45 Mark Ascher argued that a

38. See id. at 490–91; Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1994).
39. See Mann, supra note 38.
40. Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub, & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and
Counting, STAT. INCOME BULL. (I.R.S., Washington, D.C.), Summer 2007, at 118, 122,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07sumbul.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6B4-UXFY].
41. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 18–21 (2005) (describing the Gallo wine family in California who
successfully lobbied Senators Cranston and Dole in 1978 to get ten years to pay off estate taxes).
42. This more liberal curative doctrine was harmless error, also known as the dispensing power.
See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s
Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987).
43. See generally, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625 (1995) (adapting, to the trust context, the contractarian approach toward fiduciary duties from
law and economics).
44. See id. at 630 (“In emphasizing a contractarian view of the trust, the Article falls within an
intellectual movement broader than trust law. Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current in
modern American law. In fields ranging from corporations and partnership, to landlord and tenant, to
servitudes, to the law of marriage, scholars have come to understand our legal rules as resting mainly
on imputed bargains that are susceptible to alteration by actual bargains.” (internal citations omitted));
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 629–30 (2004);
Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, Contract, Trust and Corporation: From Contrast to Convergence, 102
IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1705–07 (2017).
45. See Jacobson et al., supra note 40, at 122.
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decedent’s property should escheat entirely to the state upon their death.46
His thesis was driven by the norm of fairness: permissive inheritance laws
defer excessively to testamentary intent, permitting a testator’s cold “dead
hand” to steer their assets and dictate the trajectory of their descendants
long after the testator had died.47 For extraordinarily wealthy families, this
meant that child’s station in life would be determined far more by the luck
of the family they were born into than their own diligence, which seemed
to vitiate the ideal of equality.48 Dead hand control also limits the
productive use of property by the living if, for instance, a trust only gave
life estate holders income streams but forbade assets from being sold or
pledged.49 Finally, Professor Ascher argued that at a time when the U.S.
was fixated on the federal deficit,50 it was unconscionable to let
gargantuan estates bypass a tax that could bring government coffers some
relief.51
Shortly after Professor Ascher’s seminal article, the Repealers gained
momentum, starting with sympathetic lawmakers who took Congress in
an off-cycle election. Republicans took the House in 1994 after decades
out of power; led by Newt Gingrich, the insurgent wave was different than
the previous breed of lawmakers, who had sought compromise over trench
warfare.52 These “Young Turks” allied themselves with the die-hard
Repealer Grover Norquist and then enlisted family farms and small
businesses to lay siege to the estate tax.53 This coalition achieved its first
legislative victory in the Qualified Family Owned Business Interests
provisions of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which exempted certain

46. Ascher, supra note 33, at 73.
47. Id. at 150 (“By tolerating almost unrestricted dead hand control over property, this nation has
always allowed the children of the wealthy all the financial advantages inheritance has had to offer.”).
48. See Ascher, supra note 4, at 1169 (“Failing to tax transfers of wealth at death . . . promotes and
nurtures an aristocratic class—individuals with enormous amounts of wealth and power achieved not
because of their talents or effort but solely because of the luck of their birth.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting MADOFF, supra note 2, at 68)). This argument has not been restricted to law
or a specific time period. The writer Zadie Smith, for instance, has said that “[there is the] gift of
being born in a certain condition—with a certain amount of money, in a certain state, with a certain
skin color and a certain gender. And what rights accrue to you because of that? And what duties accrue
to you because of that?” Novelist Zadie Smith on Historical Nostalgia and the Nature of Talent, NPR:
FRESH AIR (Nov. 21, 2016, 2:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/21/502857118/novelist-zadiesmith-on-historical-nostalgia-and-the-nature-of-talent [https://perma.cc/DZ8L-5MR3].
49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 116–18.
50. See Ascher, supra note 4, at 1171. This conversation now seems quaint. See Deficit Tracker,
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 13, 2021), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deficit-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/HC6S-JC2D].
51. Ascher, supra note 33, at 71–72.
52. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 24–26.
53. Id. at 27–31.
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family businesses from the estate tax.54 Because this law had been watered
down by legislative bargaining and proved too complex to be broadly
useful, it hardened the Repealers’ resolve for outright elimination of the
estate tax.55
In the academy, T&E scholars were using empirical methodologies to
show that testamentary freedom was not only elusive but also deleterious.
Melanie Leslie surveyed hundreds of probate cases to reveal that judges
enforce and disregard formalities freely to arrive at the most “natural”
dispositions, typically favoring close family members.56 Robert Sitkoff
and Max Schanzenbach combed through trust holdings reports filed with
financial regulators, estimating that roughly $100 billion in assets had
migrated virtually tax free into dynasty trusts.57 Crafty estate planners
were settling these trusts in states that had eviscerated the RAP, so that
assets could avoid taxes if they were sequestered in trusts.58
The work of Professor Sitkoff and Schanzenbach and others reified
Ascher’s argument, exposing testamentary freedom as the modus of tax
evasion.59 More fundamentally (and also more disturbingly), Professor
Leslie revealed that testamentary intent was merely a myth we teach in
law school; in practice, courts felt free to override the decedents’ wishes
to favor surviving spouses and close blood relatives.60
By 2005, when Professors Sitkoff and Schanzenbach were studying the
jurisdictional competition for trust funds, the estate tax exemption had
swollen to $1.5 million, and the top rate had come down to 47% (applying
to a top bracket of two million dollars).61 These drastic changes were the
fruit of decades of organization by the Repealers. Throughout the 1990s,
Repealers brought people of color and moderate-income families into
their fold by casting the estate tax as a chokehold on everyone’s upward
mobility—despite the reality that it touched less than 2% of households.62
When George W. Bush took the White House in 2001, federal budget
54. Id. at 34–35.
55. Id. at 35–36.
56. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235–36 (1996).
57. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359 (2005).
58. Id. at 371–74.
59. See Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities:
R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003) (tying the onslaught against the RAP in part
to the enactment of GST taxes); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 13 (tracing the decline of the
common law RAP and attributing it primarily to GST taxes).
60. Leslie, supra note 56, at 236–37.
61. Jacobson et al., supra note 40, at 122.
62. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 69, 119, 125. Of all the Repealers’ branding, the most
effective was to rename the estate tax the “death tax.”

Chang (Do Not Delete)

2022]

3/31/2022 10:43 PM

INHERITANCE LAW AND EQUALITY

71

surpluses rendered taxation less urgent, and progressive lawmakers and
organizers could not muster a cogent defense.63 The Repealers secured the
most sizeable concessions yet for the estate tax.64 These cuts were
extended and even augmented in 2010 by President Obama and
Democratic lawmakers, who were concerned about the mid-term
elections.65
Hence, the diverging paths of T&E scholars and the repeal movement
illuminate the chasm between the academy and public perceptions of the
estate tax. Today, with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the exclusion
has metastasized to $11.7 million while the top tax rate has wilted to 40%
(applying to a top bracket of one million dollars).66 Wealth inequality in
the U.S. is at levels not seen since the Gilded Age, when monopolies in
railroads and banking allowed robber barons to pillage their way to
fortunes.67 In the span of four decades, we have reprised the level of
wealth concentration at which we started out the last century (see Figure
1).

63. Id. at 99–106.
64. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38.
65. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296; David M. Herszenhorn, Next Big Battle in Washington: Bush’s
Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/politics/25tax.html
[https://perma.cc/2QLD-EG6S].
66. 26 U.S.C. § 2010; 26 C.F.R. § 20.2010-1 (2021); Julie Garber, How the Federal Estate Tax
Exemption
Changed
from
1997
to
Today,
BALANCE
(Jan.
20,
2022),
https://www.thebalance.com/exemption-from-federal-estate-taxes-3505630 [https://perma.cc/4DX3E3CV].
67. Estelle Sommeiller & Mark Price, The New Gilded Age: Income Inequality in the U.S. by State,
Metropolitan
Area,
and
County,
ECON.
POL’Y
INST.
(July
19,
2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-new-gilded-age-income-inequality-in-the-u-s-by-statemetropolitan-area-and-county/ [https://perma.cc/CF7J-D5UC].
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Figure 1: Estate Tax Exemptions and Top Rates Since 197768
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The newest generation of T&E scholarship is particularly apprehensive
about inequality. From dynasty trusts to intestacy, scholars are trying to
dismantle the structures most responsible for the velocity of inequality.
They have pointed out, for instance, that ultrarich families can avail
themselves of favorable laws and complex wealth preservation plans to
enjoy a rarified sovereignty.69 This foments systemic risk in the financial
system, shifts tax burdens to lower-income families, and widens
inequality.70 Other scholars have focused on intestacy, which is ill-suited
to the needs of heirs and survivors in low-income families—families are
often more heterogenous than intestacy defaults can account for.71 The
regime often leads to fractional interests in housing stock, a “tragedy of
the anticommons” that allows developers to pick up property cheaply,

68. Jacobson et al., supra note 40, at 122 fig. D (tracking estate tax exemptions and top tax rates
from 1916 to 2007); Garber, supra note 66 (tracking estate tax exemptions and top rates from 1997
to present).
69. See generally Tait, supra note 6 (examining how high-wealth families manipulate complex
financial rules and estate plans to construct wealth governance systems).
70. Id. at 985.
71. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows & E. Gary Spitko, How Should Non-Probate Transfers Matter
in Intestacy?, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2207, 2209–10 (2020) (probing the mismatch between intestacy
and likely donative intent); Weisbord, supra note 14, at 891–96 (examining the disadvantages of
intestacy for nontraditional families).
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evict residents, and gentrify a neighborhood.72
Methodologically, inequality-minded T&E scholars have also enlisted
increasingly sophisticated empirical techniques to gather information and
vet their hypotheses.73 The burgeoning empirical literature has covered
probate lending,74 property taxes,75 the elective share,76 and the prevalence
of estate planning.77
This critical T&E literature shuns or outright dismisses the artifice of
testamentary freedom, as if the imperative to counter inequality displaces
all other goals. Indeed, this mandate has been at least introduced and
seriously debated in virtually every other field within law.78 Inequality has
taken on heightened urgency with the string of populist political
movements (both right-wing and left-wing) exploiting economic
grievances, which only widens economic chasms once these insurgents
assume power.79 Inequality’s “pervasive and pernicious effects are
therefore a feedback loop reinforcing the concentration of economic and
political power in the hands of the very few at the expense of the great
many.”80 By virtue of its corrosive power, inequality is one of the greatest
threats of our time.
Combatting inequality can certainly be a goal of T&E. Clearly, any
invocation to history and precedent in defense of testamentary freedom is
misplaced at best and inimical to tax fairness at worst. We can even

72. See Wright, supra note 21. The anticommons situation arises when too many owners hold rights
to a scarce resource. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
73. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Empirical Analysis of Wealth Transfer Law, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2083, 2084 (2020) (introducing contributions to a symposium issue focusing on empirical scholarship
of wealth transfers).
74. E.g., David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Probate Lending, 126 YALE L.J. 102
(2016).
75. E.g., Wright, supra note 21.
76. E.g., Naomi Cahn, What’s Wrong About the Elective Share “Right”?, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2087 (2020); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Individuated Determination of a Surviving Spouse’s Elective Share,
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2473 (2020).
77. See generally Emily S. Taylor Poppe, Surprised by the Inevitable: A National Survey of Estate
Planning Utilization, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2511 (2020).
78. See, e.g., Ramsi Woodcock, Antimonopolism as a Symptom of American Political Dysfunction
(June 10, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3864585 [https://perma.cc/
KM5N-2CV8] (antitrust); Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About Economic
Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2016) (legal rules generally); Aneil Kovvali,
Countercyclical Corporate Governance (2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(arguing for a macroeconomic approach to corporate governance, in part to address inequality).
79. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 1–2, 8–9 (2016); MARTIN SANDBU, THE
ECONOMICS OF BELONGING: A RADICAL PLAN TO WIN BACK THE LEFT BEHIND AND ACHIEVE
PROSPERITY FOR ALL 12–14 (2020).
80. Chang, supra note 6, at 90.
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stipulate to the pernicious effects of inequality. However, a more basic
question remains, one overlooked in the preoccupation with inequality:
What precisely do we mean by “inequality”? More precisely, what kind
of inequality should T&E address?
B.

Defining Inequality

Inequality has different meanings and dimensions. There is income
disparity, which is what scholars and policymakers often mean by
“inequality,”81 and then there is wealth disparity, which is harder to
measure.82 There is inequality within a country, among countries, and
worldwide.83 Even the proper gauge of inequality is subject to dispute—
for instance the Gini coefficient is the standard measure,84 but it is prone
to criticism.85
Today, inequality has blurred national boundaries. The ultrawealthy
can travel and move assets effortlessly across borders.86 Outsourcing and
globalization have hollowed out manufacturing-dependent middle classes
in nearly every Western industrialized nation.87 Curiously, worldwide
81. See generally, e.g., Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline & Emmanuel Saez, Where Is
the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J.
ECON. 1553 (2014) (measuring the increase in child incomes against parental incomes); Ellora
Derenoncourt & Claire Montialoux, Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality, 136 Q.J. ECON. 169
(2020) (gauging wage differentials between Black and White workers).
82. See Sandra E. Black & Paul J. Devereux, Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mobility,
in 4b HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1533 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 2011)
(describing methodological advances in gauging intergenerational wealth elasticity); Strand, supra
note 5, at 458–60. On the difficulty of measuring wealth, see Gary Burtless, Putting a Tax on Wealth
Means
We
First
Must
Measure
It,
BROOKINGS INST.
(June
5,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/putting-a-tax-on-wealth-means-we-first-must-measure-it/
[https://perma.cc/UYC5-DXA8], describing the difficulty of valuing assets owned by the very rich
and, relatedly, of determining wealth distribution.
83. BRANKO MILANOVIĆ, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL
INEQUALITY 7–11 (2005).
84. See Human Development Reports: Income Gini Coefficient, UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAMME (2013), http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient [https://perma.cc/9JNDECCS]. The Gini coefficient “measures how equally income is distributed across a population, with
0 being perfectly equal (where everyone receives an equal share) and 1 being completely unequal
(where 100 percent of income goes to only one person).” BHATT ET AL., supra note 30.
85. See generally José Gabriel Palma, Homogeneous Middles vs. Heterogeneous Tails, and the End
of the ‘Inverted‐U’: It’s All About the Share of the Rich, 42 DEV. & CHANGE 87 (2011).
86. BROOKE HARRINGTON, CAPITAL WITHOUT BORDERS: WEALTH MANAGERS AND THE ONE
PERCENT (2016); Hidden Brain, What’s It Like to Be Rich? Ask the People Who Manage Billionaires’
Money, NPR (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/499213698 [https://perma.cc/4UFTVKH7] (interviewing Brooke Harrington, sociologist of wealth and taxation, and recounting one
wealth manager’s story of flying on a client’s private jet across borders without a passport).
87. Branko Milanović has depicted this graphically in his now-famous “elephant chart,” which
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inequality has diminished in recent years.88
Inequality is slippery and persistent. When we counter it in one area,
we may augment it elsewhere. A move to close estate tax loopholes, for
instance, gave rise to the dynasty trust.89 The field of welfare economics
is replete with exercises pondering such scenarios. For example, one
hypothetical is a society where the poorest member has wealth of nine
units, the next 1,000 poorest members have wealth of ten units, and the
remaining 1,000 members have wealth of 100 units. An allocation that
absolutely prioritizes redistribution to the poorest member may overlook
the other members who are not far off.90
More practically, some T&E reforms may exacerbate short-term
inequality in their attempts at redressing long-term inequality. As Part III
discusses, closing off estate tax loopholes may divert settlors toward inter
vivos investments (i.e., investments during a settlor’s lifetime).91 Given
that investments appreciate in value more quickly than wages rise,92 the
gaps between the investing class and labor would continue to widen.
Of inequality’s myriad variations, this Article argues that T&E must
tackle the intergenerational stickiness of wealth disparities. The field
should facilitate IEM by enabling children to eventually move into a
different economic class than their parents. At its core, T&E governs the
transmission of wealth, usually across generations.93 It is therefore an apt
setting to equalize, as much as possible, the advantages and headwinds
that each new generation is born into.
suggests, among other things, that working class incomes in developed economies have stagnated—
a feature some economists have ascribed to globalization. For a discussion, see Caroline Freund,
Deconstructing Branko Milanovic’s “Elephant Chart”: Does It Show What Everyone Thinks?,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Nov. 30, 2016, 1:45 PM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtimeeconomic-issues-watch/deconstructing-branko-milanovics-elephant-chart-does-it-show
[https://perma.cc/7B9D-345V].
88. See id. This is primarily because a vibrant middle class has emerged in Asia—more specifically,
China—where manufacturing has flourished. See id.
89. Kades, supra note 7, at 177–78; Freilich, supra note 28, at 65; Waggoner, supra note 16, at 2;
see also infra section III.A.
90. See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 752–55 (2003); see also
MARC FLEURBAEY & FRANÇOIS MANIQUET, A THEORY OF FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 39–45
(2011).
91. See infra Part III.
92. This is Thomas Piketty’s central thesis in Capital in the Twenty-First Century—that capital
grows more quickly than labor. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23,
33–36 (Arthur Goldhammer trans. 2014).
93. Even inter vivos trusts, whose assets a settlor can enjoy during their lifetime, contemplate a day
when the grants become irrevocable after the settlor passes. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d
572, 574–75 (Mass. 1984) (holding a trustee’s right to revoke an inter vivos trust is cut off at the
trustee’s death); see also KURTZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 413 (noting that “the living trust can be a
very effective technique for avoiding probate”).
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The literature on IEM is most fully developed in economics. From its
roots in the intergenerational transmission of earnings,94 the literature has
exploded into a variety of inventive empirical studies, such as the causal
effects of parental education and earnings on children’s earnings,95 the
correlation between income inequality and intergenerational earnings
elasticity,96 and the inelasticity of incomes and wealth between forebears
and descendants.97
IEM is often measured as the “stickiness” of incomes (i.e., the
inelasticity or lack of change in incomes) from one generation to the next,
a phenomenon with both lineal and lateral dimensions. At the lineal
dimension, incomes prove “sticky” intergenerationally, exhibiting close
correlation between parental earnings and a child’s earnings as an adult.98
In one novel study, researchers in Italy found that contemporary families
tend to inhabit the same occupations as their ancestors in medieval
Florence, some 600 years earlier.99 At the lateral dimension, the degree of
intergenerational earnings mobility varies geographically. Researchers
have found that moving from a zip code with low socioeconomic
indicators to a zip code with higher ones can have marked effect on a
child’s lifetime earnings.100
Even though scholars tend to use earnings as a benchmark for
inequality,101 a focus on intergenerational income differences takes us

94. For a summary, see generally Gary Solon, Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market, in
3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999).
95. Black & Devereux, supra note 82, at 1507–28. This correlation is at the heart of the economic
literature on IEM. In societies with high income inequality, incomes of the populace hold steady from
one generation to the next. Children tend to earn the same salaries as their parents, and each successive
generation tends to find itself in the same economic station as the prior generation. See Corak, supra
note 20.
96. Corak, supra note 20, at 79–80. Intergenerational earnings elasticity is the degree of fluctuation
in earnings from one generation to the next. This parameter forms the basis for the measurement of
IEM. See Black & Devereux, supra note 82, at 1489 (formula 2).
97. Guglielmo Barone & Sauro Mocetti, Intergenerational Mobility in the Very Long Run:
Florence 1427–2011, at 5–8 (Banca D’Italia Eurosistema, Working Paper No. 1060, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2856359 [https://perma.cc/94BU-SVE5]. As
the authors note, “political, demographic and economic upheavals that . . . occurred in the city across
the centuries were not able to untie the Gordian knot of socioeconomic inheritance.” Id. at 5.
98. Corak, supra note 20, at 81.
99. Barone & Mocetti, supra note 97, at 21–22. This study is subject to some criticisms; for
example, it cannot really account for the dynamics of immigration (of newcomers who might succeed
or fail) and emigration (of those who do not succeed).
100. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better
Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM.
ECON. REV. 855, 855 (2016).
101. See, e.g., Chetty et al., supra note 81, at 1563 (describing methodology of earnings analysis
from tax filings in analyzing intergenerational mobility).
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slightly off track. This Article has proposed evaluating inequality through
the intergenerational transmission of wealth, as well as countering
inequality by fostering IEM. Wealth encompasses assets accrued over
time, including those transmitted across generations.102 It is a more
accurate composite of inequality than income, which tends to be measured
as a snapshot in time.103 However, wealth is difficult enough to measure
even as a snapshot in time, much less across generations.104 Two pressing
questions follow: what does IEM-focused T&E look like, and how will
we know that it is working? The remainder of the Article addresses the
first question, raising the second for future exploration.
II.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PROGRESSIVE T&E

T&E stands as one of the last bastions against wealth disparities, where
the ill-gotten gains of one generation can be clawed back to start the next
generation off on a more equal footing. This section outlines the principles
of a progressive paradigm of T&E that prioritizes IEM. Three elements
unify such an approach: T&E’s relationship with business law; our ideals
of merit, diligence, and opportunity, which inform how much inequality
we can tolerate; and forcing mean regression in the wealth distribution
bell curve over time.
This is a significant undertaking. It requires no less than an overhaul of
how we think about T&E. Relatedly, it also requires communicating
T&E’s equalizing potential to the public, a task that scholars have
overlooked in the past.105 Yet more so than in decades, academic and
public attitudes toward inequality are converging.106 Politically,
Americans of diametric dispositions are also railing against a rigged

102. See BHATT ET AL., supra note 30, at 5 (wealth includes the value of assets minus outstanding
debt).
103. STIGLITZ, supra note 27, at 2.
104. Gabriel Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality, 11 ANN. REV. ECON. 109, 112 (2019) (“To the
extent that wealth is accumulated out of past earnings, studying its distribution is a way of getting at
the distribution of lifetime income, which is typically hard to study with available income data (most
of which are cross-sectional only.”). But see Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, The Correlation of
Wealth Across Generations, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1159 (2003) (arriving at household wealth by
tallying the value of real estate, financial assets, and other holdings).
105. See, e.g., Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1315, 1317–26 (2011) (reviewing theories of testation throughout history and across civilizations);
Langbein, supra note 2, at 491–92 (contrasting freedom of testation with the excessive formalism of
the Wills Act). Even reform-minded scholars, who pointed to deficiencies in T&E, have often avoided
a direct connection to inequality. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 56, at 236–37 (emphasizing the
imposition of a judicial moral order); Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 57, at 359 (emphasizing
jurisdictional competition).
106. On political attitudes, see infra note 109.
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economic system.107 This is an opportune time for progressive scholars to
relay the importance of T&E by capitalizing on the indignation of our era.
A.

How T&E Interfaces with Business Laws

To galvanize support for IEM, progressive T&E scholars must portray
inheritance as the realm to reset the economic playing field with each new
generation. Due to differences in education and opportunity, in any given
generation, high-income earners might accumulate far more wealth than
everyone else, but that separation need not carry over to the children of
high-income earners—and certainly not in perpetuity. 108 Inheritance law
therefore stands as the counterpoint to business law: if the latter foments
inequality, the former shall level the economic scales by progressively
reshaping wealth transfers.
Despite our era of political, social, and racial polarization, this is a
propitious time to reframe the conversation around wealth transfers. Both
conservatives and progressives agree vehemently on one thing: the
economic system is rigged.109 At the conservative end of the political
spectrum, the example is the sizeable crossover of Sanders supporters to
Trump voters in 2016.110 On the progressive end, the unexpected success
of the Jacobin magazine stands as an example of the resurgence of

107. See DĒMOS, EVERYONE’S ECONOMY: 25 FEDERAL POLICIES TO LIFT UP WORKING PEOPLE,
at ii (Amy Traub & Connie Razza eds., 2018) (summarizing survey results showing that the vast
majority of Americans assert the economic system is “rigged”).
108. By “high-income earners” and “ultrawealthy,” I refer to the top 0.1%. See Emmanuel Saez &
Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized
Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520 (2016) (“[T]he share of wealth owned by the top 1%
families has regularly grown since the late 1970s and reached 42% in 2012. Most of this increase is
driven by the top 0.1%, whose wealth share grew from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012, a level comparable
to that of the early 20th century.”); see also Howard R. Gold, Never Mind the 1 Percent. Let’s Talk
About
the
0.01
Percent,
CHI.
BOOTH
REV.
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2017/article/never-mind-1-percent-lets-talk-about-001percent [https://perma.cc/F969-K5Y7].
109. See DĒMOS, supra note 107, at ii (“73 percent of American adults agreed that ‘the economic
system in the U.S. is rigged in favor of certain groups.’ When an earlier iteration of the same survey
asked which groups the economy was rigged to benefit, 86 percent agreed it was rigged for
corporations and 91 percent asserted it was rigged to favor the rich.” (internal footnote omitted)).
These percentages are high enough to cut across political affiliation.
110. See John Sides, Did Enough Bernie Sanders Supporters Vote for Trump to Cost Clinton the
Election?, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/08/24/did-enough-bernie-sanders-supporters-vote-for-trump-to-cost-clinton-theelection/ [https://perma.cc/TU3B-HSPK] (describing Brian Schaffner’s survey which found this
number to be 12%). This connection is far from settled though. See Brian F. Schaffner, Matthew
MacWilliams & Tatishe Nteta, Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The
Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism, 133 POL. SCI. Q. 9, 30–31 (2018) (attributing Clinton’s electoral
loss to racism and sexism).
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socialist economics in our times.111
The consensus, then, seems to be that laws governing the generation of
wealth are not rules of fair play but, instead, cater to wealthy elites and
fuel inequity. Examples abound. From the 2008 financial crisis to the
Covid-19 pandemic, low-income households have borne the brunt of
recessions but were the last to be lifted by the “rising tide” of recovery.112
Households of color suffered disproportionately in both downturns, but
working-class Whites113 were stymied as well.114 Indeed, prompted by the
embrace of right-wing populism in working-class ethnic majorities around
the world, academics have been consumed with the travails of the White
working class.115 This racialized socioeconomic group has been displaced
by globalization, union busting, private equity corporate shuffles, and
other seismic trends; yet this group has also consolidated as a voting block
around nativism.116 Nonetheless, this constituency shares with the
political left the same economic grievances against ultrawealthy elites.117
Uneven business laws have allowed the already wealthy to amass
fortunes at the expense of almost everyone else. Shareholder primacy in

111. The Jacobin is socialist-leaning magazine. In the short time since its founding in 2011, the
Jacobin has reached 75,000 subscribers and a web audience of over 3,000,000 a month. About,
JACOBIN, https://www.jacobinmag.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/XDW4-LR4D].
112. See, e.g., Atif Mian, Kamalesh Rao & Amir Sufi, Household Balance Sheets, Consumption,
and the Economic Slump, 128 Q.J. ECON. 1687, 1703 (2013) (comparing the losses in net worth
among U.S. households across deciles of wealth after the Great Recession); Mitchell Barnes, Lauren
Bauer & Wendy Edelberg, 11 Facts on the Economic Recovery from the COVID-19 Pandemic,
BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/11-facts-on-the-economicrecovery-from-the-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/D4CS-GE9V] (summarizing research on
the unevenness of the economic recovery from the pandemic in the U.S.); Ambar Narayan, Alexandru
Cojocaru, Miriam Muller & David Newhouse, The Risks of an Uneven Economic Recovery in an
Unequal World, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/futuredevelopment/2021/09/27/the-risks-of-an-uneven-economic-recovery-in-an-unequal-world/
[https://perma.cc/86HZ-5JVT] (analyzing the uneven recovery worldwide).
113. I have chosen to capitalize the W in White to recognize that “White” is a race and draw
attention to Whiteness. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black,
ATLANTIC (June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalizeblackand-white/613159 [https://perma.cc/B86G-3KE5].
114. See ANNE CASE & ANGUS DEATON, DEATHS OF DESPAIR AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM
6–7 (2020) (summarizing the decline of the White working class over the last half century).
115. A brief list of examples includes the populist right’s rise in Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Hungary, Germany, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Spain, the U.K., and the
U.S. in the last two decades. See generally ANDREA L.P. PIRRO, THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: IDEOLOGY, IMPACT, AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE (2015)
(tracing populist parties such as Ataka in Bulgaria, Jobbik in Hungary, and the Slovak National Party).
116. See MÜLLER, supra note 79; SANDBU, supra note 79.
117. See MÜLLER, supra note 79 (comparing the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street as well as the
symmetry between Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders).
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corporate law elevates equity owners above all other constituents, 118
including workers (hence, the dichotomy between capital and labor),119
creditors (who, famously, are owed no fiduciary duties),120 and the public
(to whom costs are externalized).121 Corporate raiders through the decades
have exploited shareholder primacy to take over ailing companies, cut
costs mercilessly, saddled target entities with debt, and flipped them for
profit.122 In antitrust, lax policies have abetted big finance, big pharma,
big ag, and especially big tech in their erosion of salaries, privacy, and
competition.123 Sitting on fortresses of cash reserves, incumbents are able
to invest lavishly in tactics that undercut insurgents while conveying
minimal benefits to consumers.124 What emerges, then, is a two-tiered
business world where monopolies and oligopolies survive—even thrive—
amidst downturns while almost everyone else fails. At the firm level,
business laws have created stark disparities between monopolies and
oligopolies and virtually every other enterprise. At the individual level,
these disparities are enhanced by uneven tax laws governing the wealth of
firm owners.
Through it all, the largest shareholders of these goliath firms—most
prominently, Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, and

118. Equity owners hold an equity stake in a business and, thus, a stake in the profits.
119. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 323–25 (1999); PIKETTY, supra note 92, at 303–04. However, Silicon Valley turns
the primacy of capital over labor on its head. There, innovation is primarily the product of a highly
educated and handsomely paid work force, which is now being criticized for sidelining venture capital
(and its constraints on erratic founder behavior). See Charles Duhigg, How Venture Capitalists Are
Deforming Capitalism, NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2020/11/30/how-venture-capitalists-are-deforming-capitalism [https://perma.cc/W2TP-QCV7].
120. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity
of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its
duty to the corporate enterprise.”). But see Adam Hofri-Winogradow & Gal David, Quistclose Trusts
and Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duies in Near-Insolvent Companies (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
121. See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733 (2005).
122. Examples abound. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, Profits for Buyout Firms as Company Debt
Soared, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/business/economy/05sim
mons.html [https://perma.cc/83D8-RKC3] (describing storied bedding company filing for bankruptcy
protection because its investors incurred greater debts for larger short-term payouts).
123. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG AG, BIG
TECH, AND BIG MONEY 12, 19, 56–57, 223–25 (2020); DAVID DAYEN, MONOPOLIZED: LIFE IN THE
AGE OF CORPORATE POWER 9–12 (2020); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW
GILDED AGE 20–22 (2018).
124. See generally Ufuk Akcigit & William R. Kerr, Growth Through Heterogeneous Innovations,
126 J. POL. ECON. 1374 (2018) (analyzing how firm size affects innovation differently and, in turn,
economic growth).
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Warren Buffet—pocket ill-gotten gains that are not adequately recaptured
by taxes.125 The tax rates for capital gains, such as dividends from
stockholdings, are notoriously below those for ordinary income, which is
how wageworkers are paid.126 Further, the trend today is for enterprises to
move away from classifying their workers as employees, so that they can
forego benefits.127 Savvy planning can even help the ultrawealthy avoid
taxes altogether, by funneling their assets through shell companies and
jurisdictions that serve as tax dodges.128 This has prompted economists to
call for taxes on wealth holdings regardless of their situs, as well as for
corporate taxes based on customers rather than domicile.129 In reality,
taxes seem to be paid by those who cannot afford blue-chip financial and
legal counsel (i.e., most taxpayers).130

125. On the obscene increases in billionaire wealth during the pandemic, see Press Release, Ams.
for Tax Fairness, Net Worth of U.S. Billionaires Has Soared by $1 Trillion—To Total of $4 Trillion—
Since Pandemic Began (Dec. 9, 2020), https://americansfortaxfairness.org/wp-content/uploads/12-920-National-Billionaires-Report-Press-Release-1T-4T-FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/74Z2-UF6A].
This source estimates their net worth, as of March 18, 2020, at $113 billion, $24.6 billion, $98 billion,
$54.7 billion, and $67.5 billion, respectively. Id. The richest 25 Americans collectively gained $401
billion in net worth from 2014 to 2018, but they paid only 3.4% in taxes. Jesse Eisinger, Jeff
Ernsthausen & Paul Kiel, The Secret IRS Files: Trove of Never-Before-Seen Records Reveal How the
Wealthiest
Avoid
Income
Tax,
PROPUBLICA
(June
8,
2021,
5:00
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-irs-files-trove-of-never-before-seen-records-revealhow-the-wealthiest-avoid-income-tax [https://perma.cc/4HY9-JHA9]. In 2021, Democratic
lawmakers proposed a tax on unrealized capital gains that would have cost the 20 richest Americans
$345 billion, but that plan failed. Giacomo Tognini, How Much Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos Saved After
Joe Manchin Scuttled Democrats’ Tax Proposal, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2021, 6:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/giacomotognini/2021/10/29/these-billionaires-might-have-justdodged-a-333-billion-tax-bullet-thanks-to-revised-tax-proposal/?sh=a7bf9475fbde
[https://perma.cc/9NPC-3FN3].
126. See Topic No. 409: Capital Gains and Losses, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409
[https://perma.cc/JQ5U-END7].
127. See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for 21st
Century Work: The “Independent Worker”, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 8, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-proposal-for-modernizing-labor-laws-for-21st-century-workthe-independent-worker/ [https://perma.cc/N7KB-W4F6]; see also Proposition 22: Exempts AppBased Transportation and Delivery Companies from Providing Employee Benefits to Certain Drivers,
CAL.
SEC’Y
OF
STATE,
https://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2020/general/propositions/22/
[https://perma.cc/YT9G-567D] (providing a breakdown of the arguments for and against
classification of ride-share drivers as “employees” versus “independent contractors”).
128. RONEN PALAN, THE OFFSHORE WORLD: SOVEREIGN MARKETS, VIRTUAL PLACES, AND
NOMAD MILLIONAIRES 4–7 (2006); GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE
SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS 27–33 (Teresa Lavender Fagan trans., 2015); BASTIAN OBERMAYER &
FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE PANAMA PAPERS: BREAKING THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH &
POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY 13–15 (2017).
129. See PIKETTY, supra note 92, at 663–65.
130. Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden Trillions, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Oct. 27, 2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/27/panama-the-hidden-trillions/
[perma.cc/9APW-
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T&E itself plays a major role in accentuating inequality. A business
owner who engages in a risky enterprise, such as medicine,131 real
estate,132 or outright fraud,133 can set up a trust in a jurisdiction that does
not recognize foreign judgments.134 This way, if a tort victim or defrauded
contractor sues and prevails, the settlor would be judgment-proof.135
Better yet, the trust could designate the settlor as both the beneficiary and
initial trustee, so that the offender can direct the trust and enjoy its assets
during their lifetime.136 These asset protection trusts (“APTs”) generate
fees for a coterie of lawyers and financial advisors, so jurisdictions have
raced to validate them.137
Liberal inheritance laws premised on testamentary freedom then allow
those gains to be transmitted gratis to future beneficiaries, forever out of
the reach of creditors. In the example above, dynasty trusts can be settled
in states that have abrogated the RAP; consequently, the trusts never
M6MB] (“[T]he rich and the powerful exited long ago from the messy business of paying tax . . . .
They don’t pay tax anymore, and they haven’t paid tax for quite a long time.”) (quoting Luke Harding,
former Moscow correspondent for The Guardian).
131. See Asset Protection for Doctors, ASSET PROT. PLANNERS, https://www.
assetprotectionplanners.com/strategies/doctors/ [https://perma.cc/TJ6N-8LGZ]; How to Set Up a
Cook Islands Trust, OFFSHORE CORP. (Aug. 26, 2021), https://offshorecorporation.com/trust/how-tocook-islands-trust/ [https://perma.cc/UKY9-6HX6].
132. See Michael Kranish, Donald Trump, Facing Financial Ruin, Sought Control of His Elderly
Father’s Estate. The Family Fight Was Epic, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/donald-trump-father-will/ [https://perma.
cc/K58B-D3MA]; Gabe Alpert, Companies Owned by Former President Donald Trump,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 25, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/updates/donald-trump-companies/
[https://perma.cc/KU3G-55PZ].
133. FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999).
134. See, e.g., International Trusts Act § 13D (1984) (Cook Islands) (“Foreign judgements not
enforceable.”); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048–50 (2000).
135. See, e.g., Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410 (N.H. 2001) (holding that a spendthrift trust
provision prevented the victim of a sexual assault from recovering against the tortfeasor, the trust’s
beneficiary).
136. See Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1243.
137. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, How to Hide $400 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/magazine/how-to-hide-400-million.html
[https://perma.cc/
69HH-7MUB] (discussing Cook Islands trusts); Planet Money, Episode 403: What Can We Do with
Our Shell Companies?, NPR (Sept. 18, 2012, 10:34 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/money/2012/09/18/161358307/episode-403-what-can-we-do-with-our-shell-companies
[https://perma.cc/2BGJ-MPQ4] (discussing Belize trusts). For a comprehensive list of offshore
jurisdictions, see Offshore Leaks Database, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS,
https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/ [https://perma.cc/5DX7-X4C9]. One of the most unsettling revelations
of the Pandora Papers was that U.S. states are some of the most prominent “offshore” jurisdictions
for APTs. See Offshore Havens and Hidden Riches of World Leaders and Billionaires Exposed in
Unprecedented Leak, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Oct. 3, 2021),
https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/global-investigation-tax-havens-offshore/
[https://perma.cc/V5S6-3BYP] (singling out South Dakota, Delaware, and Nevada).
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terminate, and they are not assessed gift and transfer taxes.138 In this way,
the monopolist’s children and grandchildren are born into gilded cradles
where, without ever lifting a finger, they can enjoy the fruits of their
benefactors’ aggressive business tactics—a world far from the
descendants of wageworkers.
Yet T&E can also have tremendous redistributive potential. Certain
rules and doctrines act as inputs into the tax system (e.g., the RAP) or
bring together rich debtors and poor creditors (e.g., APTs).139 These rules
are distributively efficient, and they can be altered to prevent excessive
sheltering of assets.140 Such reforms might not prevent the uneven
generation of wealth (which would be the province of business laws), but
they might slow the disparate accumulation of wealth over generations.
In the past, law and economics scholars have disparaged legal rules as
a redistributive mechanism because of efficiency, legitimacy, and
administrability concerns.141 They counter that taxation is preferable.142
Today, there is a more nuanced understanding of the capacity of legal
rules to combat inequality—as well as of the failings of the tax system.143
In fact, some governments have written equity considerations into the way
their legal institutions interpret rules around contracts and torts.144
Inheritance might therefore be positioned as a safety net to arrest the
velocity of inequality as it compounds. In this way, it serves as a

138. States that have repealed the RAP or undertaken perpetuities reform include Iowa (repeal),
South Dakota (repeal), Arizona (lengthening the perpetuities period), California (lengthening the
perpetuities period), Colorado (lengthening the perpetuities period), Connecticut (lengthening the
perpetuities period), Pennsylvania (wait-and-see), Ohio (wait-and-see), and Vermont (wait-and-see).
See infra notes 187–191 and accompanying text.
139. See Chang, supra note 6, at 91–114.
140. For instance, APTs might be subjected to prohibitions against fraudulent transfers and
requirements of irrevocability; spendthrift provisions (a key feature of APTs) might be subjected to
legal protections for certain creditor claims; and dynasty trusts might be taxed heavily or abolished
outright. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(b) (AM. L. INST. 2003); UNIF. TR. CODE
§ 503(b)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570(11)(b), 3572(a) (2016); Joel
C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities: Federal and State Tools for Breaking
Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2537 (2006).
141. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35, at 822–25. This has come to be known as the double
distortion argument.
142. Id.
143. See Ronen Avraham, David Fortus & Kyle D. Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and
Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1126
(2004); Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Establishing
a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2005); Chris William Sanchirico,
Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1006–09 (2001).
144. See, e.g., American Society of Comparative Law, Legal Heterodoxy in Developing
Countries, YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1kgoW5cVfg&feature=
youtu.be (last visited Feb. 28, 2022) (discussing South Africa).

Chang (Do Not Delete)

84

3/31/2022 10:43 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:61

counterpoint to the loose business laws that allow enterprises to amass
market power,145 erode privacy,146 maximize returns to a narrow class of
insiders,147 and externalize the carnage to labor, the environment, and
public systems.148 Our society’s skepticism toward how wealth is
generated—under the rules of fair play in business law—can be harnessed
for T&E reform. T&E can claw back the ill-gotten gains from poorly
designed or enforced business laws before they are locked in for
successive generations.
B.

Balancing Equality with Opportunity

Classical liberals and Marxists have long tussled over the inevitability
of inequality. While liberals view the market as an efficient allocator of
economic mobility, Marxists believe that the market simply reproduces
class hierarchies.149 Still, both sides agree that intergenerational mobility
should be high.150 For the political right, a child should be able to
transcend their parent’s class through hard work; for the left, structural
barriers to class transcendence should be dismantled. In converging
around intergenerational mobility, many members of both the political
right and the political left would accept some degree of inequality for the
sake of individual advancement and societal prosperity.
But precisely what type of inequality should we tolerate? Here, T&E
can help formulate ground rules for equity and advancement by
highlighting the distinctions between income and wealth. Where income
measures earnings over a specific period, wealth can capture accumulated
assets over generations.
Wealth is passed directly from testators and settlors to beneficiaries.
For ultrawealthy households, the assets can include a pool of financial

145. See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017).
146. See Erika M. Douglas, Monopolization Remedies and Data Privacy, 24 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2020).
147. Blair & Stout, supra note 119.
148. See Elhauge, supra note 121.
149. Thomas Piketty, Theories of Persistent Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 429, 430–31 (A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon eds., 2000).
150. Id. at 431.
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instruments,151 real property,152 or a business;153 for poorer households,
there might be no assets—or merely a fractionated interest in a home.154
Wealth is easy to devise, hard to measure, and perhaps a truer signifier of
inequality than income.155
The intergenerational transmission of income, on the other hand, is less
straightforward. Wealthy households can cultivate human capital: for
instance, they can invest in education to ensure that the next generation
maintains high incomes. In this way, incomes become sticky not only
from one generation to the next, but also across multiple generations. And
in turn, the lack of IEM, as measured by the correlation of incomes
between fathers and sons, becomes a marker of inequality.156
Normatively, the stickiness of incomes is easier to accept than the
stickiness of wealth. To the extent that education and other forms of
human capital determine lifetime earnings, investments in these
determinants should be encouraged. Moreover, when incomes track
ability or diligence, a society that values meritocracy will endure some
degree of earnings disparity.157
Wealth disparity, on the other hand, is not so easily redeemed. A
sizeable bequest by a settlor or testator can set up beneficiaries for life; it
allows them to take risks and start businesses,158 give to charities and
imprint themselves on the civic lives of cities,159 or simply live in the lap

151. See Jon D. Wisman, Wage Stagnation, Rising Inequality and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 37
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 921, 925–26 (2013).
152. See Kranish, supra note 132. On the distinction between capital and land, especially as applied
to Piketty’s formula, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, New Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribution of
Income and Wealth Among Individuals, in 1 INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: PATTERNS AND POLICY 1,
1–3 (Kaushik Basu & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2016).
153. See Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to
S’holders 11 (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2019ltr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2QA-5EEC] (“Today, my will specifically directs its executors – as well as the
trustees who will succeed them in administering my estate after the will is closed – not to sell any
Berkshire shares.” (emphasis in original)).
154. See Thomas W. Mitchell, Reforming Property Law to Address Devastating Land Loss, 66
ALA. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2014).
155. STIGLITZ, supra note 27, at 2.
156. A confounding factor, however, is the fact that wealthy households often pass down their
family businesses, which then aligns parental and child earnings. Id.
157. Piketty, supra note 149.
158. Kranish, supra note 132.
159. See Melissa Harris and Julie Wernau, The Pritzker Family Tree, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 18, 2011),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-xpm-2011-12-18-ct-biz-1218-pritzkers-familygraphic-20111218-story.html [https://perma.cc/95XL-98AE]; Remembering Brooke Astor, N.Y.
TIMES: CITY ROOM (Aug. 13, 2007, 3:56 PM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2007/08/13/brooke-astor-is-dead-at-105/ [https://perma.cc/4N3U-36HR].
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of luxury.160 By contrast, being born into the low-income household not
only fails to convey that head start or leg up, but it may well hold a child
back for life.161
One way to view wealth disparity is as a constraint on opportunity.162
Normatively, the determinants of income should be one’s merit; yet this
maxim is eviscerated if one’s income is tied instead to the size of another
person’s devise.163 For our purposes, as we try to reorient the goals of
T&E, we must answer this question: is the field to curtail the
intergenerational stickiness of wealth or income? On this point, this
Article argues that wealth should be the focus, rather than income.
C.

Mean Regression in the Wealth Distribution Curve

To curtail the stickiness of wealth inequality, T&E should limit the
effortless transmission of wealth in hyperrich households while
facilitating it in low-income households. Visually, this is denoted by the
extreme ends of a wealth distribution bell curve converging toward the
middle. The extremities are where IEM can be fostered most efficiently.
Ultrawealthy households can be deterred from amassing more wealth,
while low-income households can be propelled forward and upward.
This is not, as is often the case in law, an argument from second-best
principles. T&E bears directly on the primary goal of unsticking
intergenerational mobility because the field governs how wealth is
transferred across generations. Nor does this Article propose to convert
T&E into a mechanism for redistribution. Instead, the Article would shore
up T&E’s defenses against the ability of the ultrarich to easily devise their
legacies to their heirs. While portions of T&E feed into the tax system, by
eschewing redistribution, reformers can avoid some of the protracted
160. Zachary R. Mider, How Wal-Mart’s Waltons Maintain Their Billionaire Fortune: Taxes,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-12/how-walmart-s-waltons-maintain-their-billionaire-fortune-taxes (last visited Feb. 28, 2022); Megan WillettWei & Mike Nudelman, Meet the Waltons: A Guide to America’s Wealthiest Family, BUS. INSIDER
(Oct. 9, 2013, 11:56 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/meet-the-waltons-wal-mart-family-tree2013-10?op=1 [https://perma.cc/4DMB-2A25].
161. Chetty et al., supra note 81.
162. For a revamp of how we view equality and opportunity, see JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS:
A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 1–10 (2014).
163. Of course, even the notion of merit belies the fact that economic success is mostly dictated by
factors wholly outside anyone’s control—including luck (the accident of the family one is born into)
and economic structures (the winner-take-all free market). See Michael J. Sandel, Populism,
Liberalism, and Democracy, 44 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 353, 356 (2018) (“In today’s economy, it is
not easy to rise. This is a special problem for the USA, which prides itself on upward mobility.
Americans have traditionally worried less than Europeans about inequality, believing that, whatever
one’s starting point in life, it is possible, with hard work, to rise from rags to riches. But today, this
belief is in doubt. Americans born to poor parents tend to stay poor as adults.”).
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theoretical discussion about double distortion, or the critique from law and
economics that using legal rules to redistribute wealth only compounds
the economic distortions in the tax system.164 Finally, to the extent that the
tax system is too feeble or unpopular to foster an egalitarian society, T&E
may be a better starting point.
Two macroeconomic perspectives on households are important: IEM
and the splintering of family compositions along economic lines.
Compared to other industrialized countries, the U.S. exhibits a high
degree of inequality and a low degree of IEM, so that the elasticity
between paternal earnings and a son’s adult earnings is extremely low.165
While we know that intergenerational earnings elasticity can be cultivated
through public institutions such as our education system,166 we are also
aware of the headwinds to class mobility. In recent decades, public
investment in education has dwindled,167 and households have responded
by augmenting their private investment in human capital outside
schooling, particularly in the elementary years.168 Rather than addressing
structural inequities, political leaders are resorting to quick fixes such as
loosening access to credit.169
Societies with high inequality also feature low IEM.170 Low IEM
dovetails with another trend in U.S. households—declines in both
marriage rates and divorce rates over the past quarter century. In higherincome households, technological improvements have made home care
easier.171 For women, delayed childbirth and higher educational
164. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35. In other words, the tax system is more efficient at
redistribution than legal rules. This argument has been subjected to a great deal of pushback. See, e.g.,
David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor, Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and
Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 358 (2015) (arguing for multiple, overlapping forms of taxation in the
face of the tax system’s overall imperfections); Dimick, supra note 78, at 58 (making the case that
legal rules may be more effective than the tax system at redistribution). For a thorough history of this
argument’s evolution, see Woodcock, supra note 78.
165. Corak, supra note 20. This line of research focuses on fathers and sons “to avoid the more
complicated analyses needed to address the changing role of women in the labor force.” Id. at 81.
While studies of mothers and daughters do exist, “father–son analyses are more common and permit
a broader set of cross-country comparisons.” Id.
166. Id. at 95–97.
167. Michael Leachman, Kathleen Masterson & Eric Figueroa, A Punishing Decade for School
Funding, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/
state-budget-and-tax/a-punishing-decade-for-school-funding [https://perma.cc/9UAH-3LVR].
168. Id.
169. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 8–9 (2010).
170. Corak, supra note 20.
171. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving
Forces 18–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 12944, 2007),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12944 [https://perma.cc/7P2T-EHJR].
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attainment have begun to close the gendered wage gap (somewhat).172
These patterns have stabilized marriages, making divorce less likely.173
Gone are the days of “production complementarities” that Gary Becker
posited of marriage, as a union between husbands and wives specializing
in different market and domestic spheres.174 Instead, marriage now binds
couples who are on similar economic footing and share similar
interests.175 Among lower-income households, however, marriage is
becoming infrequent, replaced by cohabitation.176 This bimodal
distribution reveals that marriage is becoming restricted to couples who
are more similar than different; hence, ensuing marriages, particularly
among more educated populations, are more stable.177
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, this bimodal distribution is becoming
even clearer. While wealthy households work in sectors that can switch
effortlessly to remote work, low-income households must contend with
the pandemic face-to-face.178 Put even more starkly, the reality for the
global elite is entirely different than for everyone else. A nexus of trusts
and holding companies enable these elites to stow their assets in havens
that are untouchable by taxes and political accountability.179
For ultrarich households comprised of, say, the top 0.01% of earners,
curtailing dynasty trusts could prompt would-be settlors to invest rather
than sequester their assets in trusts. One of the lessons from the 2008
financial crisis is that when these elites seek investment opportunities in
a stagnant economy, asset and real estate bubbles are created, and the
financial sector conjures ever more sophisticated products to funnel “the
rich’s surplus funds” into loans for less affluent households.180 In
172. See id. at 20–21.
173. See Shelly Lundberg, Robert A. Pollak & Jenna Stearns, Family Inequality: Diverging
Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing, 30 J. ECON. PERSPS. 79, 86 (2016) (observing
“a pattern of delayed marriage and childbearing to accommodate an extended period of education”);
id. at 80 (“Compared with college graduates, less-educated women are more likely to . . . have much
higher divorce rates.”).
174. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1993).
175. See Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 171, at 19–20, 27.
176. See T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 55, 91 (2004);
Cahn, supra note 3, at 188.
177. See Lundberg et al., supra note 173, at 81 (marriages more stable than cohabitating
relationships); id. at 82 (marriage more stable among college graduates).
178. See Covid-19 and Inequality, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., https://inequality.org/facts/inequalityand-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/UAL7-DVY5] (“The Covid-19 pandemic has forced many workers
into remote and telework as offices have closed around the country. But not everyone has the same
ability to work from home. . . . [P]eople of color have been exposed to greater virus risks.”).
179. See Paradise Papers: Secrets of the Global Elite, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/ [https://perma.cc/N47U-86CH].
180. Wisman, supra note 151, at 925.
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advocating for restraints on tax dodges for the ultrawealthy, then, we must
bear in mind whether we are trading in one type of inequality for another.
III. IMPLEMENTING IEM
T&E scholars have embraced a critical research agenda that pushes
back against inequality. Among other things, they have proposed that the
field’s legal rules be reconceptualized as redistribution mechanisms,181
that wealth transfer taxes be bolstered,182 that default rules avoid the worst
pitfalls of intestacy,183 and that dynasty and asset protection trusts be
curtailed.184 This Part illustrates what prioritizing IEM might look like in
T&E. It begins with the most distributively consequential reforms:
dismantling dynasty trusts, closing estate tax loopholes, and taxing estates
heavily—all tactics targeting ultrawealthy families. Then this Part briefly
discusses intestacy, which primarily affects lower-income households.
A.

Curtailing Dynasty Trusts

Dynasty trusts owe their existence to perpetuities reform and, by a twist
of tax history, the 1986 amendments to the GST tax, enacted to close the
loophole of estate tax avoidance through devises to grandchildren (rather
than children).185 The statute allowed trusts to be exempt from the GST
taxes but failed to impose a time limit on the duration of such trusts,
leaving their duration to the vagaries of state RAPs.186 Over the ensuing
decades, state legislatures eviscerated the RAP by adopting the wait-andsee approach,187 lengthening the perpetuities period up to 1,000 years,188
181. See generally Chang, supra note 6.
182. See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to Reduce
Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2013).
183. See Weisbord, supra note 14, at 891–98.
184. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 132–36, 181–82; Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The Stripping
of the Trust: From Evolutionary Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 529 (2014); Kades,
supra note 7.
185. Kades, supra note 7, at 177–78.
186. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 2631.
187. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(C) (LexisNexis 2021) (measuring the perpetuities
period “by actual rather than possible events”); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (West
2021) (measuring the perpetuities period “by actual rather than possible events”); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 27, § 501 (2021) (measuring the perpetuities period “by actual rather than possible events”). This
approach advocates waiting for some period to see if contingent remainders might vest. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.3 (AM. L. INST. 1983).
188. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901 (2021) (five hundred years); CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 21200–21225 (West 2021) (ninety years); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-1101 to -11-1107 (2021)
(one thousand years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-490–496 (West 2021) (ninety years); see also
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and repealing the rule altogether.189 Concomitantly, the exclusion amount
for gift, estate, and GST taxes grew from one million dollars in 2000 to
$11.58 million in 2019—amounts that could be augmented roughly
sixfold through life insurance and other estate planning strategies.190
Today, grantors with truly dynastic aspirations can settle trusts in any
number of states and forever dodge estate taxes.191
Dynasty trusts are especially pernicious in times like ours, when
interest rates hover close to 0%, economic stimulus is politically
intractable, and regulators have exhausted traditional options. 192 The
hoarding of assets in trust reinforces a paradox of thrift within the very
circles where spending is viable.193 Writing in 2005, Robert Sitkoff and
Max Schanzenbach reported that states abolishing the RAP saw their total
trust assets increase by six billion dollars (up from an average of nineteen
billion dollars) and average trust size increase by $200,000 (up from an
average of one million dollars, right at the exclusion amount).194 All in all,
approximately one hundred billion dollars had been diverted to perpetual
trusts, with virtually no benefit to the states abolishing or otherwise
curtailing the RAP.195
As the standard bearers of estate planning for the ultrarich, dynasty
trusts have been targeted by tax and T&E scholars and policymakers for
demolition. Some would close the GST loophole by cutting off the
transfer tax exemption at either ninety years after settlement or at the
generation of a settlor’s grandchildren.196 Others have suggested federal
legislation either against perpetual trusts or enabling living beneficiaries
to vote for trust termination. 197 Tax is often central to these proposals:
Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1987); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 157–59 (1988).
189. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (2021) (“There shall be no rule against perpetuities applicable
to real or personal property.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (2021) (“The common-law rule against
perpetuities is not in force in this state.”).
190. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 13, at 1318–19.
191. South Dakota is a clear example. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8. In fact, South Dakota’s
deference to settlors has turned it into one of the primary “offshore” jurisdictions for APTs. See
Offshore Havens and Hidden Riches of World Leaders and Billionaires Exposed in Unprecedented
Leak, supra note 137.
192. See Listokin, supra note 11, at 151 (“[W]hen nominal interest rates fall to zero, as they quickly
did during the Great Recession, conventional monetary policy loses traction.”).
193. See Kades, supra note 7, at 194–97.
194. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 57, at 359.
195. Id. at 359–60.
196. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE
AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 392–95 (Comm. Print 2005).
197. Dobris, supra note 140, at 2542–43.
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perpetual trusts would look very different if they were taxed
mercilessly.198 More directly, as a cudgel against wealth inequality,
scholars have proposed a wealth tax to supplant income, GST, and estate
taxes.199 Wealth taxes would squarely confront the disparity in pace of
growth between the capital (e.g., real estate or corporate holdings held by
ultrarich households in trusts) and labor (i.e., how most households make
money), though their constitutionality is contested.200
One of the most innovative suggestions has come from Eric Kades.
Professor Kades proposes taxing dynastic trusts to spur spending. He
would achieve this by disincentivizing savings above the rate where
consumption is maximized.201 This rate is known as the “golden rule,” and
it is pegged at 15%.202 The golden rule rate equals the “sum of the
depreciation rate for capital (roughly, the annual rate at which capital
wears out) and the rate of growth of the population.”203 Additionally, to
combat the shorter-term paradox of thrift, Professor Kades has suggested
taxing dynasty trusts as an “automatic stabilizer” during economic
downturns.204 These taxes would counteract excessive savings among
wealthy households, prompting settlors to redirect some of their assets
from trusts toward spending and investment.205
Yet a perpetuities amendment faces legal and macroeconomic
challenges. Because dynasty trusts are creatures of a race to the bottom
with states competing for trust assets, federal intervention is required.
Thus, the most viable schemes would harness federal taxation powers or
some form of coordinated national response.206 Nonetheless, competition
for trust assets does not only occur within the U.S.—it happens

198. See id. at 2541–42.
199. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, How Would a Progressive Wealth Tax Work?:
Evidence from the Economics Literature (Feb. 15, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-zucman-wealthtaxobjections.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FXLAM27] (advancing proposals to enforce a progressive wealth tax). Piketty himself proposes this as a
more direct solution to wealth inequality. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL AND IDEOLOGY (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2020). The constitutionality of wealth taxes in the U.S. has been debated. See
Daniel Hemel & Rebecca Kysar, The Big Problem with Wealth Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/opinion/wealth-tax-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/65FJ83RA].
200. See Hemel & Kysar, supra note 199.
201. Kades, supra note 7, at 198.
202. Id. at 207–08; see also Edmund Phelps, The Golden Rule of Accumulation: A Fable for
Growthmen, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 638 (1961).
203. Kades, supra note 7, at 198.
204. Id. at 208–10.
205. See id.
206. See Freilich, supra note 28, at 99.
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internationally as well.207 Wealth flows to the jurisdictions that regulate it
most lightly, and grantors have already settled trillions of dollars in APTs
offshore, to keep them out of the reach of creditors.208 Dismantling
dynasty trusts here might push settlors to re-route funds into countries that
already operate as situses for their APTs.
A more worrisome consequence of curbing dynasty trusts, however, is
that it will catalyze certain forms of inter vivos expenditures over others.
Stronger GST taxes on dynasty trusts, just like robust estate taxes, drive
settlors toward lifetime consumption.209 Increased spending by settlors
and lifetime beneficiaries certainly bolsters demand for goods and
services, similar to the multiplier effect that Keynesian fiscal policy seeks
to achieve.210 However, even the most determined beneficiary can find it
difficult to fully spend down exorbitant sums of money.211 If settlors
permit unused funds to be directed toward investment, they may hasten
inequality in unexpected ways, particularly during recessions.212
Some economists have traced the financial crisis back to ultrawealthy
families and their hunt to invest unconsumed assets.213 Prior to the crisis,
opportunities were rare because companies were funneling retained
earnings not into investment or wages but, rather, into dividends (which
operated as a feedback loop for income inequality).214 As a result,
financiers packaged the wealth of rich households into loans to lowerincome households—loans that were securitized and then sold on
secondary markets.215 In addition to augmenting the credit circulating the
207. Rusbridger, supra note 130.
208. An APT is a self-settled (i.e., the settlor is the beneficiary) trust with the “disabling restraint”
of a spendthrift provision that prevents the sale, assignment, and alienation of the beneficiary’s
interest. See, e.g., FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999); see also
Sterk, supra note 134, at 1048–50; Rusbridger, supra note 130 (“The economic system is, basically,
that the rich and the powerful exited long ago from the messy business of paying tax . . . . They don’t
pay tax anymore, and they haven’t paid tax for quite a long time.”) (quoting Luke Harding, former
Moscow correspondent, The Guardian). On disabling restraints, see Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift
Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1995).
209. Daniel J. Amato, Note, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Political Economy and
Unintended Consequences of Perpetual Trusts, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 637, 640 (2013).
210. See Kades, supra note 7, at 195–27.
211. For actual and fictional examples, see Geraldine Fabrikant, Brooke Astor Has a Year’s Worth
of Giving Left, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/18/nyregion/brookeastor-has-a-year-s-worth-of-giving-left.html
[https://perma.cc/LZ9W-53XS];
BREWSTER’ S
MILLIONS (Silver Pictures 1985).
212. See Wisman, supra note 151, at 926 (explaining how investments in the housing market during
low interest rates after the 2001 recession created a housing bubble).
213. See, e.g., id. at 925 (analyzing the financialization of the economy that stemmed from the
recycling of wealth from rich households as loans to less well-off households).
214. Id. at 925.
215. Id. at 924–26.

Chang (Do Not Delete)

2022]

3/31/2022 10:43 PM

INHERITANCE LAW AND EQUALITY

93

financial markets, this created housing and stock bubbles.216 In boom
times, to paraphrase Piketty’s paradigm,217 the value of capital pulls away
from the value of labor; in downturns, capital is funneled into devalued
assets, sowing the seeds for inequality. This dynamic mirrors theoretical
studies of firm behavior in low-interest environments, which have found
that incumbents with market power tend to invest while smaller players
do not.218 Eventually, the smaller firms exit the market, enhancing its
concentration. All in all, recessions lay the groundwork for future
inequality; prying assets from the coffers of dynasty trusts for spending
may contribute to widening income and wealth gaps. Put differently, this
strategy amounts to trading one type of inequality for another.
How, then, should we assess the different types of inequality? This
Article argues that T&E reforms should prioritize IEM. The most
consequential way for T&E to foment IEM is to reform the regime’s rules
affecting the top end of the wealth spectrum. Dismantling dynasty trusts,
closing estate tax loopholes, and taxing estates heavily could frustrate the
ability of ultrarich households to pass their wealth onto future generations.
Over time, then, these reforms increase the likelihood that lineal
descendants of the top 0.01% might slide down the economic ladder.
Because the instruments and doctrines of T&E govern the transmission
of wealth across generations, T&E as a field can affect intergenerational
wealth disparities. For ultrawealthy households, reductions in assets held
by dynasty trusts can precipitate the downward slide of future generations.
Even if inequality is fomented intragenerationally through heightened
investment, it may be necessary in the advancement toward more parity
in intergenerational mobility between rich and lower-income households.
B.

Addressing the Distortions from Intestacy

For lower-income households, intestacy stands as the greatest threat
within T&E to the intergenerational transmission of wealth. Accordingly,
scholars have recommended a number of improvements to intestacy. For
example, appending a will as a testamentary schedule to tax filings would
reduce the instances of intestacy.219 Utilizing a decedent’s nonprobate
transfers (e.g., insurance or retirement plan beneficiary designations) to

216. Id. at 926, 929.
217. PIKETTY, supra note 92, at 33–34. Piketty’s framework r > g is that the return on capital
outstrips the economic growth rate. Id.
218. Ernest Liu, Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Low Interest Rates, Market Power, and Productivity
Growth 39 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25505, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25505 [https://perma.cc/93RD-UA7Y].
219. See Weisbord, supra note 14, at 920.
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guide intestacy distributions would help conform to a decedent’s likely
wishes—especially if it resulted in distributions to non-family members,
who are disfavored under intestacy defaults.220 Similarly, permitting
transfer-on-death designations for homes, the most valuable asset in most
estates, would enable homes to pass outside the probate system and
directly to heirs.221 These designations would then reduce the likelihood
of intestate successors receiving fractionated interests.222
As with dynasty trusts, taxes are also central to the analysis of intestacy.
Delinquency in paying property taxes, often in combination with the
inability to physically maintain real property, can result in tax sales and
foreclosures when heirs hold partial interests in a home.223 Staying tax
sales and foreclosures for a period after a decedent’s death would allow
heirs to pay off those debts and retain the home—or to restore and sell
it.224
These proposals share two themes: honoring, rather than vitiating,
testamentary freedom; and maximizing the assets passed from decedents
to their heirs.225 Advancing these two goals will enable testators to
transmit assets as they see fit, which is more likely to keep assets intact
than conveying multiple takers fractional interests. Given intestacy’s
limitations in accommodating the heterogeneity and desires of lowincome households, honoring testamentary freedom should transmit more
wealth to heirs. In some instances, heirs will not spend their windfalls.
Inheritance windfalls may even defy the policy goals of other types of
windfalls, such as when governments give tax breaks or stimulus checks
to lower-income households to lubricate spending.226 Yet if heirs choose
to hold onto their devises—for example, by living in, rather than selling,
a home—those devises would provide a tailwind for economic mobility.
And if assets can be transmitted to the next generation, then

220. See Fellows & Spitko, supra note 71, at 2254–55.
221. See Wright, supra note 21, at 2637–38.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2632. For a discussion on the racial dimensions of this problem, see Bernadette Atuahene
& Christopher Berry, Taxed Out: Illegal Property Tax Assessments and the Epidemic of Tax
Foreclosures in Detroit, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 847 (2019).
224. Wright, supra note 21, at 2632.
225. These proposals also highlight disparities between the probate system, which touches
succession in most households, and the relative ease of nonprobate transfers such as trusts. To be sure,
probate is intractable for many heirs, but a fuller exploration of the bimodal distribution between
probate and nonprobate is beyond the scope of this Article.
226. On the spending habits of recipients of the pandemic stimulus relief, see How Did Americans
Spend Their Stimulus Checks and How Did It Affect the Economy?, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND.
(May 14, 2021), https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2021/05/how-did-americans-spend-their-stimuluschecks-and-how-did-it-affect-the-economy [https://perma.cc/PTY5-7HV2].
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intergenerational mobility is all the likelier.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined potential reforms to T&E from the
standpoint of reducing inequality. Where results conflict with short-term
economic stimulus, or seem indeterminate in confronting inequality, this
Article would prioritize the result that best cultivates intergenerational
economic mobility. While this Article analyzed dynasty trusts and
intestacy as surrogates for ultrawealthy and lower-income households,
wealth distribution is not entirely bimodal, and many instruments (e.g.,
inter vivos trusts) within T&E cater to the needs of the significant
proportion of middle and upper-middle income households. Dynasty
trusts and intestacy may be the most distributively consequential areas of
T&E, but scholars should also assess the myriad other instruments of T&E
that affect inequality and intergenerational mobility. With IEM as the
field’s first principle and mean regression as its economic guidepost, T&E
will be better positioned to counter inequality.
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